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Abstract
In this article we examine the impact of cultural distance on the pricing of corporate bonds
issued in the United States. We ﬁnd that greater cultural differences between U.S.
investors and foreign issuers increase the cost of debt. We also ﬁnd that the cost of Rule
144a offers is less sensitive to cultural distance and creditor protection effects because of
the different market structure and investor bases in the Yankee and Rule144a bond
markets. Our results suggest that cultural differences inﬂuence bond pricing through an
information asymmetry channel.
JEL Classification: G12, G15, G34
I. Introduction
In this article we examine whether cultural differences between borrowers and lenders
inﬂuence non‐U.S. ﬁrms’ cost of debt in the Yankee and Rule 144a bondmarkets. Studies
have identiﬁed that cultural differences have a profound impact on corporate ﬁnancial
decisions and economic development.1 Although cultural distance can be used to measure
the degree to which shared norms and beliefs differ from one country to another, people
from dissimilar cultures are less likely to build trust with one another, and there are more
uncertainties in predicting the behavior of others as well. Consequently, for corporate
bonds issued in the United States by foreign ﬁrms, cultural differences may increase the
cost of information gathering and may serve as a measure of information asymmetry
between creditors (U.S. investors) and issuers (foreign ﬁrms).
The literature on the cost of debt suggests that information asymmetry between
borrowers and lenders increases the credit premium required by investors (Wittenberg‐
Moerman 2010; Derrien et al. 2012). In the context of international capital markets, it has
been argued that a relatively high level of differences in accounting disclosure
requirements and legal protections is likely to lead to an increase in information
We are grateful to the associate editor (Andy Naranjo) and Eastern Finance Association 2014 conference
participants for valuable comments and constructive suggestions.
1For example, Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) suggest that national culture determines the capital structure
choice. Zheng et al. (2012) ﬁnd that even after controlling for legal, political, and ﬁnancial systems, national culture
signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the maturity of corporate debt.
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asymmetry between investors and foreign borrowers. Therefore, investors may demand
higher yield spreads to ameliorate this uncertainty, especially to issuers domiciled in
countries with weak investor protection provisions (La Porta et al. 1997; Miller and
Puthenpurackal 2002; Qian and Strahan 2007; Miller and Reisel 2012).
In this article, we extend the literature by considering the impact of culture
distance in determining a foreign ﬁrm’s cost of debt in the two U.S. corporate bond
markets: the public Yankee bond market and the privately placed Rule 144a bond market.
We use a sample of Yankee bonds and Rule 144a bonds issued by foreign ﬁrms from 37
countries during 1996–2012 as these are two major markets that foreign ﬁrms use to
borrow U.S. dollars in the United States.2
We examine several important issues in the two U.S. corporate bond markets that
have not yet been addressed in the literature. First, we test whether a greater cultural
difference between the United States and other countries increases the cost of debt for
issuers domiciled in non‐U.S. countries. Following Kogut and Singh (1988) and
Morosini, Shane, and Singh (1998), wemeasure themultidimensional cultural differences
between the United States and other countries by using Hofstede’s (2001) four dimension
scores: uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and power distance.3 We ﬁnd
that greater cultural differences between U.S. investors and foreign domiciled issuers
increase the cost of debt in both the Yankee and Rule 144a bondmarkets. Our ﬁndings are
robust to controlling for a country’s legal environment, ﬁnancial development, prior U.S.
public debt, and equity listing. We interpret our results as consistent with the asymmetric
information hypothesis (Wittenberg‐Moerman 2010; Halov and Heider 2011; Derrien
et al. 2012). Cultural dissimilarities increase the cost of information gathering; thus, bond
issuers from countries with a greater cultural difference with the United States may be
considered risker by U.S. investors. Therefore, U.S. investors typically require a higher
yield for the bonds issued by these foreign ﬁrms.
In addition, we address the consequences of the four subcomponents of cultural
differences separately. The four subcomponents are deﬁned as the absolute value of the
difference between the issuing country and the United States on Hofstede’s (2001) four
cultural dimensions. We ﬁnd a positive relation between the cost of debt and uncertainty
avoidance subcomponent (UAI), and the individualism subcomponent (IDV). The
dimension of uncertainty avoidance measures the level of acceptance of uncertainty and
ambiguity (i.e., risk aversion level of a country). In contrast, the individualism dimension
is linked to overconﬁdence behavior (Chui, Titman, andWei 2010) and overconﬁdence in
the perception of risk (Hackbarth 2008). The results suggest that risk‐averse U.S. creditors
may demand higher yields when their risk preference and interpretation of risk are
different from foreign borrowers.
2Non‐U.S. ﬁrms can also borrow in the eurodollar market. However, eurodollar bonds are issued in bearer
(unregistered) form, which is different from Yankee bonds and Rule144a bonds. Also, the primary market for
eurodollar bonds is in London, not in the United States.
3Long‐term orientation is a ﬁfth dimension, developed later based on the Chinese Value Survey of students,
which covered only 23 countries. Long‐term orientation emphasizes a forward‐looking perspective. However,
because the long‐term orientation dimension has a quite different sample coverage as compared to the other four
dimensions, it is not comparable to them and thus is excluded from our study.
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Second, we test the joint effects of culture distance and creditor rights in
determining a foreign ﬁrm’s cost of debt in the twoU.S. corporate bondmarkets. Consistent
with Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002), in the Yankee bond market we ﬁnd that investors
demand a premium on bonds issued by ﬁrms that are located in countries with low creditor
rights. However, in the Rule 144a market, the creditor rights variable is not signiﬁcantly
related to the cost of the debt. The results are consistent with Ball, Hail, and Vasvari (2013)
and reﬂect the difference in the market structures between the two U.S. corporate bond
markets. In the case of the Yankee bond offers, U.S. creditors likely rely more on country‐
level governance institutions for protection, enforcement, and monitoring. However, in the
Rule 144a market, private and institutional U.S. investors can obtain privileged access to
information. They have the resources and incentives tomore closelymonitor the borrowers.
The reliance on credit rights protection, thus, is not signiﬁcant. Given the signiﬁcant effect
of creditor rights on the yield spread in the Yankee bond market, it is interesting to
empirically examine the joint impact of cultural distance and creditor rights on the pricing of
the corporate bonds issued by the non‐U.S. ﬁrms. Our results suggest that better creditor
rights moderate the positive impact of cultural distance on the cost of debt, but it is not large
enough to completely offset the inﬂuence of cultural distance.
Third, Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) examine the inﬂuence of cultural differences
on syndicated bank loans. They document that more culturally distant banks offer
borrowers smaller loans at higher interest rates. We extend their study by focusing on the
effect of cultural distance as it relates to the public Yankee bonds and privately placed
Rule 144a bonds. We ﬁnd that foreign domiciled issuers being more culturally different
from U.S. investors prefer to use longer term and smaller debt amounts with high‐yield
spreads after controlling for a country’s legal environment, ﬁnancial development,
prior U.S. public debt, and equity listing.
Last, because our sample period from 1996 to 2012 includes the 1997 Asian
ﬁnancial crisis and the 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis periods, we separate the entire sample
into a noncrisis period subsample and a crisis period subsample (1997, 2008, and 2009).
We ﬁnd that the positive relation between cultural distance and the cost of debt holds only
for the noncrisis subsample. In the crisis subsample, the relation is signiﬁcant and
negative, which suggests that during these years a greater cultural difference between the
United States and another country decreases the cost of debt for issuers domiciled in that
country. The results support Erel et al. (2012) and Cai, Jiang, and Lee (2013), who argue
that when market conditions are unfavorable, only high‐quality issuers have access to the
debt market, and the market reacts favorably to successful debt issues during economic
downturns. The ability of a culturally distant non‐U.S. ﬁrm to access the U.S. debt market
under challenging conditions favorably reﬂects the quality of the issuing ﬁrm and reduces
its cost of debt.
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses
The Two U.S. Corporate Bond Markets Accessed by Foreign Firms
To issue corporate debt in the United States, non‐U.S. ﬁrms can choose either the Yankee
bond market or the Rule 144a market. The Yankee bond market is regulated by U.S.
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regulations and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Non‐U.S. issuing
ﬁrms must adhere to similar registration and disclosure requirements as U.S. ﬁrms if they
choose to issue bonds in the Yankee bond market. Before the offering, ﬁrms need to ﬁle a
registration statement and provide a prospectus including extensive ﬁnancial information.
The ﬁnancial numbers need to be reconciled with U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP). The regulations provide some protections to U.S. investors. However,
at the same time they increase the issuing cost, as well as the time needed to bring the issue
to the market.
The Rule 144a bondmarket imposes less regulation on the issuing ﬁrms. It allows
ﬁrms to raise U.S. dollar‐dominated bonds in the United States as private placements to
qualiﬁed institutional buyers (QIBs). Rule 144a bond offers do not need to be registered
with the SEC. Firms only need to provide basic information and ﬁnancial information to
the prospective purchasers. The ﬁnancial numbers do not need to be reconciled with U.S.
GAAP either. Rule 144a debt provides speedy access to the U.S. corporate bond market.
However, it has limited liquidity as Rule 144a offers can only be resold immediately to
QIBs.
As documented in Giddy (1994), Fabozzi (2001), andMiller and Puthenpurackal
(2002), domestic bond markets have not been a major source of capital raising outside the
United States. Therefore, the Yankee and Rule 144a bond markets provide an important
avenue for non‐U.S. ﬁrms to raise debt capital that is not available in their home country.
These two bond markets play a major role in the development of the international capital
market.
Bond Pricing
The literature documents that information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders
increases the credit premium that investors demand. Borrowers could improve
information transparency to reduce the cost of debt ﬁnancing. For instance, Mansi,
Maxwell, andMiller (2011) ﬁnd that analyst forecasts contain rich information about ﬁrm
value, suggesting that analyst activity lowers bond pricing even after controlling for the
level of corporate disclosures and private information in equity prices.
In the context of international capital markets, it has been argued that a relatively
high level of differences in accounting disclosure requirements and legal protections is
likely to lead to increased information asymmetry between investors and foreign
borrowers. Therefore, investors demand higher yield spreads for this uncertainty,
especially to issuers domiciled in countries with weak investor protections (La Porta
et al. 1997; Miller and Puthenpurackal 2002; Qian and Strahan 2007; Miller and
Reisel 2012). Overall, the literature conﬁrms that country‐level differences in legal
protections and information availability have been established as an indicator explaining
international capital raising.
National Culture
National culture has been widely used to explain international investment strategy and
corporate ﬁnancial decisions. For instance, Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) document that
high individualism is associated with large trading volume, high volatility, and more
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proﬁt momentum. Zheng et al. (2012) show that ﬁrms located in countries characterized
by high uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, masculinity, and power distance tend to use
more short‐term than long‐term debt. In addition, Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) document
that cultural distance between borrowers and lenders in the syndicated bank loan market
increases the loan spread. As these studies demonstrate, greater cultural distance limits
familiarity among counterparties and increases the cost of information gathering and,
thus, may serve as a proxy for intrinsic information asymmetry.
Hypotheses Development
Studies (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997; Miller and Puthenpurackal 2002; Qian and
Strahan 2007; Miller and Reisel 2012) document that information asymmetry between
creditors and borrowers increases the cost of debt. For foreign ﬁrms borrowing in the U.S.
market, differences in accounting standards, disclosure requirements, cultures, languages,
legal protections, and law enforcement are likely to lead to increased information
asymmetry between U.S. investors and foreign borrowers. This important feature allows
us to extend the link of information asymmetry and the cost of debt by relating cultural
differences between U.S. investors and non‐U.S. bond issuers.
Cultural distance can be used tomeasurewhether and howmuch shared norms and
beliefs differ from one country to another. A larger cultural distance increases the cost of
information gathering. Thus, cultural differences may serve as a measure of information
asymmetry between U.S. investors and non‐U.S. issuers. We therefore offer hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: Firms originating in countries with cultural values far from those
in the United States experience a higher cost when raising capital
in the U.S. corporate bond markets.
In the context of international capital markets, studies (e.g., La Porta
et al. 1997, 2000; Miller and Puthenpurackal 2002) document that country‐speciﬁc
legal protections also play a fundamental role in the cost of raising capital. For example,
investors require a higher risk premium for securities originated in countries with weak
creditor protection (La Porta et al. 1997, 2000).Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002) provide
strong evidence that borrowing ﬁrms originated in countries with weak legal protections
and rule of law tend to experience higher debt costs in the Yankee bond market. Larger
cultural differences from the United States represent a higher degree of uncertainty and
tend to increase the risk premium investors in the United States require. On the other hand,
having better legal protection is likely to increase the recovery rate when there is a default,
thus decreasing the cost of issuing bonds. We therefore expect that better creditor
protection decreases the cost of debt by counteracting the inﬂuence of cultural differences
between their originated countries and the United States. This leads to hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Better creditor rights moderate the impact of cultural distance on
the cost of debt. The costs of debt are higher for ﬁrms domiciled in
countries that have a large cultural distance from the United
States, along with poor creditor rights.
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III. Data and Variables
Sample Selection
We use Securities Data Company (SDC) data from 1996 to 2012 to identify the sample of
debts issued in the United States by non‐U.S. ﬁrms. We use the credit rating of Moody’s
whenever it is available and use a Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rating when aMoody’s rating
is not available. We obtain detailed issue characteristics information such as issue date,
issue amount, seniority, country of domicile, and maturity date from SDC. Following the
literature (Gao 2011), we delete bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms (Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation code [SIC]¼ 6XXX).
We merge these bonds with their corresponding cultural values retrieved from
Hofstede’s (2001) cultural indices. To be included in the sample, the issuing country must
have at least ﬁve bonds, as well as all four cultural dimension scores. Our ﬁnal sample has
1,673 bonds issued by 37 countries and captures more countries than previously reported
(e.g., Miller and Puthenpurackal 2002; Qi, Roth, and Wald 2010; Gao 2011). We then
merge the sample with the information from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and provided by the Bank of New York for the foreign ﬁrm cross‐listing.
Measure of Yield Spread
For these 1,673 bond issues, we calculate yield spreads, which we use to measure the cost
of debt. Yield spread (YIELD) is computed as the bond’s offer yield minus the Treasury
rate of comparable maturity. The data on the yields of Treasury bonds are obtained from
the Federal Reserve Database (FRED). They represent the daily averages of the constant‐
maturity yield. If the maturity period of a corporate bond does not exactly match that of
Treasury bonds, we use the Treasury bonds with the closest maturity.
Measure of Cultural Distance
Based on cultural distance as deﬁned by Kogut and Singh (1988) and modiﬁed by
Morosini, Shane, and Singh (1998), we measure national culture distance as the degree to
which the cultural norms in one country differ from those in another country. Speciﬁcally,
we calculate the multidimensional cultural distance between the United States and other
countries using Hofstede’s (2001) four dimension scores: uncertainty avoidance,
individualism, masculinity, and power distance:4
CDi ¼ 14
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃX4
j¼1 ðDi;j  DUS;jÞ
2
r
;
4 In particular, the dimension of uncertainty avoidance measures the level of acceptance of uncertainty and
ambiguity within a society. A country with a high uncertainty avoidance score is more risk averse. The dimension of
individualism focuses on the degree to which a society reinforces individual versus collective achievement and
interpersonal relationships. Individualism is linked to overconﬁdence behavior (Chui, Titman, and Wei 2010), as
well as overconﬁdence in risk perception (Hackbarth 2008). A high masculinity score indicates that the males in that
country dominate society and have much more control and power than females. Likewise, the dimension of power
distance focuses on the degree of equality/inequality between people within a society. A high power distance
suggests that a country accepts and perpetuates inequalities between individuals.
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where CDi is the cultural distance for the ith country and Di,j denotes Hofstede’s cultural
scores for the ith country with a jth cultural dimension.
Two key reasons motivate us to select this measure of cultural distance. First,
Hofstede‘s (2001) four cultural dimensions have been largely adopted for studies in the
international business literature (Kwok and Tadesse 2006; Chui and Kwok 2008; Chui,
Titman, and Wei 2010; Han et al. 2010). The validity and reliability underlying
Hofstede’s cultural index make it the best ﬁt for our study. Second, extensive evidence
(e.g., Kogut and Singh 1988; Morosini, Shane, and Singh 1998; Giannetti and Yafeh
2012) suggests that the composite single measure of cultural distance accounts for the
various aspects of the underlying national cultural scores.
The Yankee and Rule 144a bond markets provide an explicit channel for non‐
U.S. ﬁrms to raise debt in the U.S. capital market. The markets are generally composed of
foreign domiciled issuers and U.S. investors. In our unique market setting, the United
States is the only host country; U.S. investors account for all unpredicted risks by issuers
from dissimilar cultures when pricing bonds issued by non‐U.S. ﬁrms. The use of the
composite single measure of cultural distance, where we calculate the multidimensional
culture distance between the United States and other countries using Hofstede’s (2001)
four dimension scores, allows us to measure the degree of cultural norms between U.S.
investors and foreign domiciled issuers and directly capture the information asymmetry
between them.
Additionally, studies (e.g., Chui, Titman, andWei 2010; Li et al. 2013) show that
Hofstede’s (2001) uncertainty avoidance and individualism cultural dimensions are two
of the most relevant culture values inﬂuencing corporate risk preference. In an attempt to
examine what role, if any, the four cultural components in the measure of cultural distance
play in determining the cost of debt in the Yankee and Rule 144a bond markets, we also
use the absolute value of the difference between the issuing country and the United States
on four dimensions fromHofstede’s (2001) cultural indices—UAI, IDV,MAS, and PDI—
as proxies for alternative culturally distant values.5 Figure I shows a country’s cultural
difference from the United States and the mean yield spreads. It shows that in general, the
mean yield spreads are positively related to CD.
Country‐ and Issue‐Speciﬁc Characteristics
To better understand the impact of cultural distance on bond yields, it is important to
control for other relevant issue‐speciﬁc and country‐level variables. We include variables
that are commonly used in the literature. AMT is the logarithm of the dollar size of the net
proceeds of the bond issue in millions of dollars. MAT is the logarithm of the issue’s
maturity in years. I(aa, bbb), I(bb), I(b), and I(c) are indicator variables representing Moody’s
rating of the issue. For example, I(aa, bbb) equals 1 if bonds are rated AA, A, or BBB, and 0
otherwise. I(bb) equals 1 if bonds are rated BB, and 0 otherwise. TheAAAdummy variable
5According to Hofstede’s (2001) cultural index, the uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and
power distance scores for the United States are 46, 91, 62, and 40, respectively. In comparison to other countries, the
United States has been considered an uncertainty‐accepting society, a highly individualistic culture, and amasculine
society, and has equality among individuals.
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has been dropped to avoid collinearity in the data. PUT is a dummy variable that equals 1
if the bond is putable. SUB equals 1 if the issue is subordinated. COVENANT is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if there are covenants associated with the issue. Last,RULE144A is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is in the Rule 144a bond market.
Ball, Hail, and Vasvari (2013) document that the information transparency of
foreign ﬁrms increases their visibility among U.S. investors. Having shares traded in the
United States before the bond issue provides high‐quality information, which in turn
lowers offering yields for bondholders. Thus, we use LISTING_US as a proxy for whether
the ﬁrm is listed in the U.S. equity market before the bond offering. For foreign ﬁrms that
have a history of issuing public debt, they beneﬁt from a good reputation for repaying
creditors (Diamond 1989) and improved corporate governance (Stulz 1999). Therefore,
these ﬁrms have lower borrowing costs. Consequently, we control for seasoned debt,
SEASONED_DEBT, which measures whether the ﬁrm issued public debt in the U.S.
capital markets before the bond issuance.6
We also control for the quality of a country’s legal system and investor protection.
Speciﬁcally, we include country‐level governance quality control variables. CRmeasures
creditor rights (La Porta et al. 1998), which is an aggregate score ranging from 0 (weak
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Figure I. Cultural Distance versus Mean Yield Spreads. The ﬁgure shows cultural distance and average yield
spread by borrower nationality. The x‐axis is the nation, where the country codes are deﬁned in Table 1,
and the order of the national codes corresponds to columns (1) and (2) in that table. The y‐axis is the
corresponding yield spreads, and the z‐axis is cultural distance value.
6Because near‐term prior issues have more information than long‐term issues, we also employ an alternative
measure, TIME_DEBT, as a proxy for prior debt issues, where TIME_DEBT is deﬁned as the natural logarithm of the
number of days between the current and prior issues. We replicate all estimation regressions throughout the study by
replacing SEASONED_DEBT variable with the TIME_DEBT variable. The results of cultural distance remain
quantitatively similar and the corresponding tables are not reported for brevity.
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creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). ANTI_SD is an anti‐self‐dealing index
(Djankov et al. 2008), deﬁned as an average of ex ante and ex post private controls of self‐
dealing, where the former represents the average approval by disinterested shareholders
and ex ante disclosure; the latter is the average of disclosure in periodic ﬁlings and the ease
of proving wrongdoing. LEGAL_UKmeasures a country’s legal origin based on common
law tradition (La Porta et al. 1998) and is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a country’s
legal origin is English common law, and 0 if the legal origin is French, German, or
Scandinavian civil law. NANT_DIR is the revised antidirector right index (Djankov
et al. 2008), measured as an aggregate index of shareholder rights.
In addition, if the home market has limited capital market access, paying a higher
cost for outside capital is a likely outcome. Thus, following the literature (e.g., Rajan and
Zingales 1998; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007), we use FINANCIAL_DEV as an
additional explanatory variable to measure the capital market development in the ﬁrm’s
country of origin. We collect ﬁnancial market development data from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) online database. We construct the ratio of stock market
capitalization to GDP and the ratio of a country’s domestic credit to GDP as proxies for
stock market development and credit market development, respectively. We set
FINANCIAL_DEV as stock market development whenever stock market development
data are available and as credit market development when stock market development data
are not available.
Panel A of Table 1 reports Yankee bonds and Rule 144a bonds issued across
industries and countries over the 1996–2012 period. Firms from the United Kingdom
(270) are the most frequent issuers, followed by Mexico (165) and Brazil (155). Issues
placed by ﬁrms domiciled in these three countries account for 35% of the sample. In terms
of the industry distribution, we use the 12 Fama–French industry classiﬁcation codes
(Fama and French 1997). The largest number of issues occurs in the manufacturing (565),
telephone and television transmission (244), and energy (207) industries. These three
industry groups account for 60% of the sample.
Panel B of Table 1 reports Yankee and Rule 144a bonds issued across years and
countries over the 1996–2012 period. In the Yankee bond market, the largest number of
issues occurs in 2002 (80), 1999 (73), and 1998 (67). These three years account for
27.88% of the Yankee bond issues in our sample. In the Rule 144a bond market, the
largest number of issues occurs in 2011 (88), 2009 (80), and 1997 (72). These three years
account for 27.15% of the Rule 144a bond issues in our sample.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for our key variables. Panel A reports the
mean and median of the yield spread, cultural distance, and its subcomponents across
country. In general, a higher cultural distance is associated with a greater yield spread. For
example, at the country level, Australia has the smallest cultural distance from the United
States at 1.64, with an average yield spread of 2.37%. Venezuela has the greatest cultural
distance from the United States at 23.64, with an average yield spread of 3.22%, which is
85 basis points higher than that of Australia. At the ﬁrm level, Cable & Wireless Optus
PTY in Venezuela issued an bond rated A in the United States on May 25, 2000. The
offering amount was $225 million and the time to maturity was ﬁve years. The bond had a
yield spread of 2.32%. Corporacion Andina De Fomento in Australia issued a bond rated
A– in the United States on June 16, 2000. The offering amount was $500 million and the
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time to maturity was 10 years. The bond had a yield spread of 2.07%. Although these two
companies issued bonds at the same time and are from the same industry, the yield spread
for Cable &Wireless Optus PTY is greater than that of Corporacion Andina De Fomen by
25 basis points even though Cable &Wireless has a better rating. This result may due to a
cultural difference as Australia has a much smaller cultural distance from the United
States than Venezuela.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the mean and median of the yield spread, cultural
distance, and its subcomponents for each rating group. It shows that bonds rated A–,
BBB–, and BB are the largest groups, which account for 22.12%, 22.89%, and 21.58% of
the sample, respectively. Investment‐grade (IG) bonds account for 57.86% of our sample
with an average yield spread of 1.65%, whereas high‐yield (HY) grade bonds account for
the remaining 42.14% with an average yield spread of 4.96%. Overall, the yield
distribution in our sample supports the evidence that the higher the rating, the lower the
cost of debt. Additionally, HY bonds have higher values of UAI, IDV, PDI, and CD, but
lowerMAS value. The evidence provides further support of the positive relation between
the cost of debt and a foreign issuer’s cultural differences from the United States.
IV. Empirical Results
Univariate Tests
We begin by investigating the unconditional relation between the cost of debt and cultural
distance by examining the potential time‐varying nature of our sample. Figure IIa
illustrates the unconditional correlation between the cost of debt and cultural distance (and
number of non‐U.S. borrowers) by year. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on CD are all
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These results suggest a positive
relation between the cost of debt and cultural distance in the Yankee and Rule 144a bond
markets when no variable is controlled.
We next conduct univariate tests to identify the effects of culture differences and
credit rights on the yield spread. Panel A of Table 3 reports the mean yield spread for
bonds issued by ﬁrms from countries that have low (CD Low) and high (CD High)
cultural differences from theUnited States.CDLow (High) denotes that the issuing ﬁrm is
from a country that has a cultural distance value below or equal to (above) the median
cultural distance, which is 15.29. CR Low (High) means that the issuing ﬁrm is from a
country that has a creditor rights index below or equal to (above) the median value, which
is value of 2. For issuing ﬁrms domiciled in countries that have low credit rights (CR Low
group), those originated in CD High countries have a cost of debt that is 77 basis points
higher than CD Low countries. The difference in the CD Low group compared to the CD
High group is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. However, for issuing ﬁrms
domiciled in countries that have better credit rights (CR High group), the difference
between two cultural difference subgroups is not signiﬁcant. The univariate test results are
consistent with our two hypotheses: (H1) ﬁrms originated in countries with cultural value
far from those in the United States experience a higher cost when raising debt in the U.S.
corporate bond market, and (H2) better creditor rights moderate the impact of cultural
distance on the cost of debt.
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Our sample period is from 1996 to 2012 including the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis
and the 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis periods. To identify how a country’s cultural distance
from the United States affects the cost of borrowing during market turmoil, we split the
sample into two subsamples: the ﬁnancial crisis period and the noncrisis period.
Following the previous literature, (e.g., Michayluk and Neuhauser 2006; Conyon, Judge,
and Ussem 2011), we deﬁne 1997, 2008, and 2009 as the ﬁnancial crisis period and the
rest of the sample period as the noncrisis period. We ﬁnd that the univariate test of the
differences in mean yield spreads for the CD (Low and High) subsamples exhibit
statistically different results in the noncrisis and crisis periods. In the noncrisis period, the
results are consistent with the ﬁndings in the overall sample. In the crisis period, the results
for the CR Low group are consistent with the overall sample. However, the results for the
CRHigh group are different. In the crisis period, issuing ﬁrms that domiciled in countries
with high credit rights (CR High group) and a high culture difference (CD High)
experience a 107 basis points lower cost of debt than those from countries with a low
culture difference (CD Low). The results support the ﬁndings of Erel et al. (2012) and Cai,
Jiang, and Lee (2013). They argue that during poor economic conditions, information
problems faced by ﬁnancially strained ﬁrms become more severe, prohibiting them from
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Figure II. Unconditional and Conditional Coefﬁcient Estimates of Cultural Distance. Figures IIa and IIb show
the unconditional and conditional coefﬁcients, respectively, of cultural distance from cross‐sectional
year‐by‐year regressions. The x‐axis is the year, the y‐axis is the number of bonds, and the z‐axis is the
coefﬁcient estimates.
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raising external capital. Under challenging market conditions, a culturally distant ﬁrm’s
access to the U.S. debt market reﬂects the quality of the ﬁrm, which affects their debt
costs.
Baseline Models
We use multivariate models to formally test our two hypotheses. Table 4 reports the
baseline regression models. The models include issue‐speciﬁc and country‐level
variables, which are widely used in the cost of debt literature to examine the impact
of cultural difference and its subcomponents on the cost of debt. In models 1–4, we
separately include the four subcomponents of cultural distance (UAI, IDV, MAS, and
PDI). In models 5–7, we incorporate the cultural distance measure (CD), the term that
interacts the measure of cultural distance with the investor rights variable (CDCR)
omitting CR, and the interaction term (CDCR) omitting CD. In all the models, we
control year and the 12 Fama–French industry effects. The t‐statistics are based on two‐
way cluster‐robust standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011) with clustering
on both the issuing country and the issuing ﬁrm.
TABLE 3. Mean Yield Spreads for Cultural Distance and Creditor Rights Subsamples.
CD Low CD High Difference
N Mean STD N Mean STD Difference t‐statistics
Panel A. Overall Sample
CR Low 321 2.95 2.42 623 3.72 2.17 0.77 4.80
CR High 545 2.48 2.37 184 2.60 1.95 0.12 0.68
Total 866 2.65 2.40 807 3.47 2.18 0.81 7.25
Panel B. Noncrisis Period
CR Low 255 2.95 2.53 494 3.76 2.19 0.81 4.34
CR High 464 2.29 2.32 142 2.62 1.99 0.33 1.69
Total 719 2.52 2.41 636 3.51 2.19 0.98 7.86
Panel C. Crisis Period
CR Low 66 2.93 1.96 129 3.57 2.13 0.63 2.07
CR High 81 3.60 2.38 42 2.53 1.83 1.07 2.76
Total 147 3.30 2.22 171 3.31 2.10 0.01 0.04
Note: This table reports the comparison of mean yield spreads for bonds issued by ﬁrms from countries that have a
low culture difference from the United States (CD Low) versus bonds from countries that have a high culture
difference from the United States (CDHigh). Panel A shows the subsample test for the 1996–2012 period. Panels B
and C present the time subsample tests in the noncrisis and crisis periods, respectively. The crisis period includes the
1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis, and the noncrisis period contains the rest of sample
period.CD Low (High) means that the issuing ﬁrm is from a country that has a culture distance value below or equal
to (above) the median of culture distance, which is 15.29. CR Low (High) means that the issuing ﬁrm is from a
country that has creditor rights index below or equal to (above) the median of credit rights, which is 2.
Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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TABLE 4. The Effect of Cultural Distance on the Cost of Debt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD
UAI 0.013
(5.95)
IDV 0.007
(5.88)
MAS 0.010
(3.76)
PDI 0.003
(0.80)
CD 0.019 0.026
(2.98) (4.47)
CDCR 0.003 0.004
(1.18) (1.62)
CR 0.009 0.025 0.014 0.082 0.040 0.114
(0.20) (0.68) (0.29) (1.56) (0.94) (2.42)
FINANCIAL_DEV 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(2.70) (3.73) (2.58) (2.29) (3.31) (2.94) (2.98)
ANTI_SD 0.286 0.466 0.187 0.007 0.246 0.249 0.133
(1.33) (1.59) (0.73) (0.03) (0.86) (0.84) (0.46)
LEGAL_UK 0.178 0.243 0.316 0.044 0.190 0.176 0.110
(1.06) (1.16) (1.29) (0.21) (0.90) (0.83) (0.48)
NANT_DIR 0.089 0.117 0.103 0.063 0.102 0.101 0.089
(2.25) (2.64) (2.41) (1.31) (2.21) (2.16) (1.88)
AMT 0.070 0.073 0.075 0.078 0.076 0.075 0.078
(3.28) (3.54) (3.73) (3.58) (3.39) (3.53) (3.56)
MAT 0.053 0.009 0.047 0.042 0.018 0.018 0.027
(1.32) (0.21) (1.17) (1.07) (0.45) (0.43) (0.65)
SEASONED_DEBT 0.122 0.143 0.125 0.102 0.129 0.130 0.118
(2.08) (2.60) (2.36) (1.84) (2.30) (2.23) (2.11)
LISTING_US 0.123 0.096 0.086 0.124 0.113 0.119 0.110
(1.52) (1.05) (1.01) (1.65) (1.37) (1.36) (1.30)
I(aa, bbb) 1.130 1.079 1.099 1.104 1.094 1.094 1.098
(8.35) (8.90) (8.49) (8.03) (8.34) (8.37) (8.40)
I(bb) 3.613 3.446 3.473 3.547 3.497 3.487 3.523
(30.00) (33.71) (30.04) (29.52) (29.98) (28.84) (30.58)
I(b) 5.102 4.991 5.010 5.053 5.030 5.028 5.038
(51.81) (67.46) (56.65) (51.38) (55.21) (53.35) (54.71)
I(c) 4.645 4.533 4.559 4.583 4.563 4.556 4.580
(16.07) (15.01) (15.49) (16.18) (15.61) (15.58) (15.80)
PUT 0.413 0.448 0.432 0.398 0.426 0.425 0.420
(3.63) (4.24) (3.75) (3.37) (3.95) (3.89) (3.73)
SUB 2.480 2.559 2.507 2.553 2.549 2.544 2.559
(1.71) (1.79) (1.71) (1.87) (1.82) (1.80) (1.86)
COVENANT 0.163 0.163 0.146 0.154 0.163 0.165 0.158
(1.69) (1.71) (1.48) (1.54) (1.66) (1.67) (1.60)
RULE144A 0.793 0.769 0.800 0.794 0.778 0.781 0.779
(7.94) (8.09) (7.84) (7.95) (7.87) (7.69) (7.80)
(Continued)
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In model 1 of Table 4, the coefﬁcient estimate on UAI is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which suggests that issuing ﬁrms in countries with a high
difference in uncertainty avoidance scores from the United States tend to experience
higher debt costs. The effect of UAI is also economically signiﬁcant. A one standard
deviation increase in UAI (14.71) increases the yield spread by 19.12% (14.71 times
0.013). The results suggest that risk‐averse U.S. creditors require higher yields when their
risk tolerance is different from non‐U.S. borrowers.
Model 2 in Table 4 presents the results for the IDV subcomponent. The coefﬁcient
on IDV is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, suggesting that issuing ﬁrms in countries with a high
difference in individualism scores from the United States tend to experience higher debt
costs. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in IDV (27.06) increases the yield
spread by 18.94% (27.06 times 0.007). Studies (e.g., Hackbarth 2008; Chui, Titman, and
Wei 2010) document that individualism is linked to overconﬁdence behavior and
overconﬁdence is related to growth and risk perception bias. The results suggest that risk‐
averse U.S. creditors demand a higher yield spread when their interpretations of risk are
different from non‐U.S. borrowers.
In model 3 of Table 4, the coefﬁcient on MAS is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. A society with high masculinity scores is more assertive and
competitive and shows a big gap between male and female values. The results suggest
that U.S. investors require lower yields when their view on gender differences is different
from non‐U.S. borrowers. Model 4 shows the results on the effect of the power distance
subcomponent on the cost of debt. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on PDI is not statistically
signiﬁcant, which suggests that the power distance subcomponent does not play a role in
determining the cost of debt.
In model 5 of Table 4, we test the impact of cultural distance on the cost of debt.
The coefﬁcient on CD is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. It is also economically
signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation increase in cultural distance (7.14) would imply a
13.57% (7.14 times 0.019) increase in yields. The result implies that the uncertainty
TABLE 4. Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD
Intercept 0.204 1.917 0.810 0.880 0.548 0.407 0.865
(0.94) (8.06) (3.35) (3.62) (2.69) (2.66) (3.81)
Observations 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673
R2 0.670 0.670 0.668 0.666 0.667 0.668 0.667
Note: This table presents the estimation results obtained by regressing the yields spread (YIELD) on cultural distance
(CD) and its corresponding subcomponents and on controls of bond characteristics and country variables in the
comprehensive set of Yankee and Rule 144a bonds. The Appendix provides the deﬁnitions of the regression
variables. For the sake of brevity, industry and year controls are included, but the results are not tabulated. The
industry controls are based on the 12 Fama–French industry classiﬁcation codes. The t‐statistics based on two‐way
cluster‐robust standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011) with clustering on both the issuing country and
the issuing ﬁrm are reported in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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avoidance and individualism subcomponents mainly contribute to the positive relation
between the cost of debt and cultural distance. The larger cultural distance between
originate countries of bond issuers and U.S. creditors increases borrowing costs, which
supports hypothesis 1.
In model 6 of Table 4, the effects of cultural differences between U.S. investors
and foreign issuers are tested jointly by the coefﬁcients onCD andCDCR. It shows that
the coefﬁcient on CD is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level with a magnitude of 0.026.
The result provides strong support for Hypothesis 2 concerning the moderating effect of
better investor rights protection in the relation between cultural distance and the cost of
debt.
In model 7 of Table 4, we test an interactive slope change in creditor rights via
cultural distance by the coefﬁcients on CR and CDCR. It shows that the coefﬁcient on
CR is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, with a magnitude of –0.114, which suggests
that better creditor protections decrease the cost of debt by counteracting the inﬂuence of
cultural differences between their countries of origin and the United States, which is
consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Consistent with the literature, in all models in Table 4, we ﬁnd that bond ratings
play an important role in determining the yield spread. All credit rating dummies (I(aa, bbb),
I(bb), I(b), and I(c)) are economically and statistically signiﬁcant. A negative relation
between the ﬁrm’s country of origin capital development (FINANCIAL_DEV) and the
cost of debt provides empirical evidence that paying more for outside capital is a likely
outcome if the home market has limited capital market access. The coefﬁcients for the
Rule144A dummy are signiﬁcant and positive, which suggests that a Rule144a issuance is
different from the public offers in explaining the determinants of international capital
raising given the opportunity set and other less restrictive offering characteristics of Rule
144a issues.
As Yankee bond and Rule 144a bond markets differ in the different market
structure and investor bases, we thus split the sample of Yankee bond and Rule 144a bond
offers and redo the baseline regression analysis. Results in Panel A of Table 5 are the same
as those in Table 4, which suggests that the combined market results are driven by the
Yankee bond market. Panel B of Table 5 shows the results in the Rule 144a market.
Results in models 1–5 are consistent with those in Panel A of Table 5. However, models 6
and 7 suggest that the impact ofCR on the cost of debt is different in the Rule 144amarket.
In particular, model 6 shows that neither cultural distance nor an interactive slope change
in cultural distance via creditor rights is signiﬁcant in the Rule 144a bondmarket. Model 7
shows that neither credit rights nor the interaction term is signiﬁcant in the Rule 144a bond
market.
The impact ofCR on the cost of debt in the Yankee andRule 144a bondmarkets is
consistent with Ball, Hail, and Vasvari (2013) and reﬂects the difference in the market
structures. In the case of the Yankee bond offers, U.S. creditors likely rely more on
country‐level governance institutions for protection, enforcement, and monitoring.
Therefore, better creditor rights moderate the impact of cultural distance on the cost of
debt. However, in the Rule 144a market, private and institutional investors in the United
States can obtain privileged access to information. They typically have the resources and
incentives to more closely monitor borrowers. The reliance on the credit rights protection,
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therefore, is not signiﬁcant. Models 5–7 in Panel B also show that the cost of debt is less
sensitive to the effects of cultural distance in the Rule 144a bond market. This may also
result from the different investor bases for the Yankee and Rule 144a bondmarkets. Given
the nature of institutional investors, they might likely be somewhat less sensitive to the
cultural distance effect.
TABLE 5. The Effect of Cultural Distance on the Cost of Debt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD
Panel A. The Yankee Bond Market
UAI 0.011
(2.99)
IDV 0.013
(5.55)
MAS 0.014
(3.62)
PDI 0.003
(0.62)
CD 0.042 0.072
(4.03) (6.18)
CDCR 0.012 0.008
(4.89) (2.11)
CR 0.174 0.168 0.138 0.195 0.184 0.315
(2.50) (3.09) (1.96) (2.82) (3.11) (3.20)
Observations 789 789 789 789 789 789 789
R2 0.644 0.655 0.645 0.640 0.647 0.649 0.642
Panel B. The Rule 144a Bond Market
UAI 0.011
(4.01)
IDV 0.003
(3.32)
MAS 0.007
(3.14)
PDI 0.000
(0.11)
CD 0.009 0.007
(2.73) (1.25)
CDCR 0.001 0.003
(0.46) (1.48)
CR 0.053 0.025 0.034 0.004 0.015 0.029
(2.29) (1.24) (1.52) (0.12) (0.67) (0.96)
Observations 884 884 884 884 884 884 884
R2 0.660 0.659 0.659 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.658
Note: This table reports the regression results by splitting the sample into Yankee and Rule 144a bond issues. For the
sake of brevity, all the controls are the same as in Table 4, but the results are not tabulated. The Appendix provides
the deﬁnitions of the regression variables. The t‐statistics based on two‐way cluster‐robust standard errors
(Cameron, Gelbach, andMiller 2011) with clustering on both the issuing country and the issuing ﬁrm are reported in
parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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Overall, considering cultural distance as a determinant of borrowing costs, the
larger the different codes and norms between non‐U.S. borrowers and U.S. investors, the
higher the borrowing costs will be. In the Yankee bondmarket, better protection rights for
investors in the non‐U.S. country partially offset the inﬂuence of cultural distance, but not
enough to completely counteract the cost‐increasing effects of cultural distance. This
ﬁnding does not hold in the Rule 144a market. This could be due to the different market
structure and investor bases for these two markets.
V. Robustness Checks
Cultural differences can increase the information asymmetry between U.S. investors and
non‐U.S. borrowers, as well as increase the return U.S. investors require for this
uncertainty. We conduct tests to ensure the robustness of our results to: (1) nonprice
contract terms, (2) time variation, and (3) ﬁnancial crisis.7
Nonprice Contract Terms
Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) examine the effect of cultural distance on syndicated bank
loans and argue that cultural differences inﬂuence contracting costs, as well as the
nonprice contractual terms. To assess how cultural distance inﬂuences nonprice
contractual terms, we replicate the main analyses using the maturity of the issue (MAT)
and amount of borrowed (AMT) funds as the dependent variables.
Table 6 presents the estimation results for nonprice contract variables—MAT and
AMT—as a contrast to model 5 in Table 4. In models 1, 3, and 5, MAT is the dependent
variable, and in models 2, 4, and 6, AMT is the dependent variable. The coefﬁcients onCD
in models 1 and 5 are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which suggests that U.S.
creditors tend to require longer term debt from foreign issuingﬁrms that aremore culturally
different from the United States. This ﬁnding suggests that U.S. investors prefer longer
term foreign bonds from ﬁrms whose cultural norms are far different from the United
States. The coefﬁcients on CD in models 4 and 6 are also statistically signiﬁcant, which
suggests that more culturally distant ﬁrms are more likely to offer U.S. creditors lower debt
amounts. The evidence supports the concept that U.S. creditors offer more culturally
distant foreign borrowers smaller amounts of debt, which complements and is consistent
with the ﬁndings in the syndicated bank loan market (Giannetti and Yafeh 2012).
Time Variation
The main analyses address time variation issues by incorporating year‐level ﬁxed effects.
Given the foundational nature of the cultural distance variable, which does not materially
change over time, our main results may overstate the effect of cultural distance. To
7Thus far, we use the two‐way cluster‐robust approach (Cameron, Gelbach, andMiller 2011) with clustering at
both the ﬁrm and country levels throughout the analyses. The results of cultural distance remain quantitatively
similar if we use alternative estimation approaches: (1) one‐way analysis of variance and (2) hierarchical linear
modeling (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002), which include the explanatory and control variables from Table 4 and are
not reported for brevity.
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alleviate this concern, we examine the relation between the cost of debt and cultural
distance by running a series of the cross‐sectional year‐by‐year regressions. Figure IIb
shows the extent to which the cultural distance effect varies through time as a contrast to
model 5 in Table 4. Consistent with our univariate analysis results in Table 3, we ﬁnd that
TABLE 6. The Effect of Cultural Distance on Nonprice Contract Terms.
Yankee Bonds Rule 144a Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables MAT AMT MAT AMT MAT AMT
CD 0.023 0.017 0.001 0.017 0.015 0.010
(4.10) (1.55) (0.25) (5.80) (3.45) (2.44)
CR 0.029 0.006 0.014 0.037 0.012 0.040
(1.24) (0.10) (0.83) (1.16) (0.65) (1.54)
FINANCIAL_DEV 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.44) (4.65) (0.10) (3.10) (0.66) (4.90)
ANTI_SD 0.804 0.549 0.032 0.410 0.409 0.018
(7.04) (1.95) (0.41) (2.09) (5.66) (0.16)
LEGAL_UK 0.453 0.250 0.140 0.235 0.265 0.171
(3.08) (1.04) (1.77) (3.44) (2.19) (1.86)
NANT_DIR 0.083 0.256 0.027 0.173 0.035 0.188
(2.10) (2.94) (1.44) (8.31) (1.32) (4.56)
SEASONED_DEBT 0.222 0.199 0.005 0.048 0.096 0.124
(7.62) (1.80) (0.21) (0.74) (4.83) (1.66)
LISTING_US 0.188 0.053 0.001 0.043 0.071 0.034
(2.40) (0.25) (0.03) (0.45) (1.08) (0.19)
I(aa, bbb) 0.219 1.124 0.457 0.187 0.366 0.472
(4.83) (5.45) (9.22) (2.03) (7.49) (3.93)
I(bb) 0.343 0.987 0.276 0.089 0.339 0.542
(11.03) (9.59) (6.05) (0.68) (8.62) (6.28)
I(b) 0.237 0.738 0.178 0.286 0.221 0.680
(6.55) (4.60) (4.47) (2.64) (4.98) (7.26)
I(c) 0.433 2.002 0.081 0.656 0.056 1.281
(4.35) (9.09) (1.04) (6.26) (0.71) (14.31)
PUT 0.560 1.287 0.302 0.043 0.350 0.516
(3.64) (2.14) (2.85) (0.60) (2.52) (2.24)
SUB 0.190 1.814 0.133 0.672 0.072 0.250
(1.27) (8.32) (1.68) (8.47) (0.84) (0.26)
COVENANT 0.234 1.539 0.015 0.111 0.147 0.814
(7.00) (6.82) (0.40) (2.40) (3.75) (6.76)
RULE144A 0.087 0.194
(1.38) (2.90)
Intercept 1.031 13.530 1.751 13.529 1.476 13.965
(9.13) (23.06) (19.66) (88.76) (11.36) (80.26)
Observations 789 789 884 884 1,673 1,673
R2 0.265 0.310 0.130 0.323 0.141 0.245
Note: This table presents the estimation results obtained by regressing nonprice contract terms—bond maturity
(MAT) and bond size (AMT)—on cultural distance (CD) and controls of bond characteristics and country variables.
For the sake of brevity, industry and year controls are included, but the results are not tabulated. The t‐statistics based
on two‐way cluster‐robust standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011) with clustering on both the issuing
country and the issuing ﬁrm are reported in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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the coefﬁcients on CD are positive and statistically signiﬁcant in most of the noncrisis
years and are negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the crisis years.
Financial Crisis
The univariate tests in Table 3 and the year‐by‐year variations in Figure IIb show that the
relation between the cost of debt and cultural distance varies during the crisis and
noncrisis periods examined. To alleviate the concern that the recent ﬁnancial crisis
interferes with our results, we split the entire sample into crisis period and noncrisis period
subsamples and follow the empirical approach in model 5 of Table 4 to avoid potential
biases that may derive from the ﬁnancial crisis. Estimates in Table 7 show that the issuing
ﬁrms in a country with cultural norms far different from the United States tend to
experience higher borrowing costs in the noncrisis period. However, this relation is
reversed in the ﬁnancial crisis period. The results are consistent with Tables 3 and 6 and
support the ﬁndings by Erel et al. (2012) and Cai, Jiang, and Lee (2013). Under
challenging economic conditions, the ability of a culturally distant ﬁrm to access the U.S.
debt market reﬂects the quality of the ﬁrm and affects its cost of debt.
VI. Conclusions
In this article we examine the important role of cultural distance in bond pricing.
Employing a sample of Yankee and Rule144a bonds from 37 countries for the 1996–2012
period, we ﬁnd that greater cultural distance from the United States increases the cost of
debt ﬁnancing. Our initial inferences hold while controlling for a country’s legal
environment, ﬁnancial development, prior U.S. public debt, and equity listing. Our results
TABLE 7. The Effect of Cultural Distance on the Cost of Debt: Crisis versus Noncrisis Periods.
Yankee Bonds Rule 144a Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD YIELD
CD 0.044 0.057 0.066 0.021 0.077 0.032
(4.09) (6.94) (6.76) (4.45) (10.82) (5.71)
CR 0.126 0.173 0.174 0.001 0.027 0.047
(1.37) (3.78) (3.31) (0.04) (0.42) (1.41)
RULE144A 1.246 0.714
(14.69) (7.06)
Observations 136 653 182 702 318 1,355
R2 0.497 0.702 0.430 0.692 0.473 0.705
Note: This table reports the regression results by splitting the sample period into the crisis and noncrisis periods.
Columns (1), (3), and (5) include only the crisis period, and columns (2), (4), and (6) contain the noncrisis period.
The crisis and noncrisis periods are deﬁned as in Table 3. For the sake of brevity, all the controls are the same as in
Table 4, but the results are not tabulated. The Appendix provides the deﬁnitions of the regression variables. The t‐
statistics based on two‐way cluster‐robust standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011) with clustering on
both the issuing country and the issuing ﬁrm are reported in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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suggest that more uncertainties in predicting the behavior of others with greater distance
may result from differences in norms and beliefs, which in turn inﬂuences bond pricing
through an information asymmetry channel.
Our article contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we demonstrate that
cultural distance affects the pricing of bonds issued by non‐U.S. ﬁrms in the two U.S.
corporate bond markets—public Yankee bonds and privately placed Rule 144a bonds.
The results provide evidence that foreign domiciled issuers with cultural values that
greatly differ from those in the United States face higher yield spreads when raising
capital in these two markets.
Second, we test the joint role of better legal protection and cultural distance and
how they affect bond pricing. We ﬁnd that better creditor protection moderates the
inﬂuence of cultural distance on the cost of debt, but it is not large enough to completely
negate the impact of cultural distance. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Miller and
Puthenpurackal 2002; Ball, Hail, and Vasvari 2013), however, this ﬁnding only holds in
the Yankee bond market. One interpretation of this ﬁnding is that the two U.S. corporate
bond markets accessed by foreign ﬁrms differ in their regulatory requirements,
information provision, investor bases, and investors’ ability to monitor. Under the
different investor bases, institutional investors might likely be somewhat less sensitive to
the effect of cultural distance between countries.
Finally, to the extent that more culturally distant banks offer borrowers smaller
loans in the syndicated loan market (Giannetti and Yafeh 2012), we show that foreign
domiciled issuers that are more culturally different from the United States prefer to use
longer term and smaller debt amounts in the Yankee and Rule 144a bond markets.
Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variables Descriptions
YIELD Yield spread is computed as the bond’s offer yield over the Treasury rate of comparable
maturity
UAI The absolute value of the difference between the issuing country and the United States
on Hofstede’s (2001) cultural index of uncertainty avoidance
IDV The absolute value of the difference between the issuing country and the United States
on Hofstede’s cultural index of individualism
MAS The absolute value of the difference between the issuing country and the United States
on Hofstede’s cultural index of masculinity
PDI The absolute value of the difference between the issuing country and the United States
on Hofstede’s cultural index of power distance
CD Cultural distance is calculated as a multidimensional measure that estimated the distance
between the United States and other countries along Hofstede’s four dimension scores
CR Creditor rights: aggregate score ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor
rights)
FINANCIAL_DEV Financial development measures the ratio of country’s stock market capitalization over
its GDP, where stock market capitalization is defined as the summation of share price
times the number of shares outstanding of each listed stock
(Continued)
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